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189 
REPLY TO KOPPELMAN: 
ORIGINALISM AND THE (MERELY) 
HUMAN CONSTITUTION 
Steven D. Smith* 
Andy Koppelman’s provocative diagnosis1 of originalism, of 
Jack Balkin, and of disgust gets one thing right and several 
things backwards. Or so it seems to me. I’ll start with the things 
Koppelman gets backwards. Then I’ll say what I think 
Koppelman gets right, and how he and Balkin make a 
potentially valuable (albeit partly inadvertent) contribution not 
only to originalism but to the ongoing experiment in democratic 
self-governance. 
I 
Over the last several years, and to the surprise of some, 
Professor Balkin has proclaimed himself an originalist. He has 
advocated what he calls the “method of text and principle”—an 
approach which, by interpreting the Constitution’s original 
meaning to embrace a set of open-ended principles, is able to 
justify pretty much any results that the most ardently progressive 
constitutional heart could desire.2 Less expansive originalists 
have sometimes expressed skepticism about Balkin’s ostensible 
conversion, and on occasion they have vigorously criticized the 
version of originalism that Balkin advocates.3 
 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This 
comment was written by invitation as a reaction to Andy Koppelman’s essay called “Why 
Jack Balkin is Disgusting.” I thank Larry Alexander and Michael Perry for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177 
(2010). 
 2. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427 passim (2007) [hereinafter Constitutional Redemption]; Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 passim (2007). 
 3. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its 
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 879–80 (2009). For an incisive criticism 
from a non-originalist perspective, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its 
Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two about Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007). 
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Koppelman thinks he perceives in this critical reaction a 
feeling of “disgust,” and it is this perception that informs his 
assessment of originalism. I confess that I am not perfectly clear 
on exactly what the originalists’ ostensible feeling of disgust4 is 
supposed to reveal. Sometimes Koppelman indicates that disgust 
serves to police the boundary between the human and what 
might be called the subhuman—to distinguish humans from 
“animals and animal waste products.” (184–185). The larger 
discussion suggests, however, that disgust reflects a revulsion 
against the (merely) human—”our animal vulnerability and 
mortality” (184)—arising out of a yearning for something that 
transcends the human: “transcendent aspiration,” “transcendent 
ideal,” and a “transcendent ideal of justice.” (180, 182). So the 
overall argument, as I understand it, is that originalists feel 
disgust toward Balkin because he has ostensibly demonstrated5 
what originalists are loathe to admit—namely, that the 
Constitution “is a human construct” and that “[w]e are, perhaps, 
all that the Constitution is constituted out of. Its innards are as 
slimy as ours.” (187) 
There is in this assessment a valid and valuable point, I 
believe, which I will come to shortly. In general, though, 
Koppelman’s diagnosis seems . . .well, pretty much upside down. 
It is as if Koppelman has gotten his characters mixed up—he has 
confused Macbeth with Macduff, so to speak—and thus has 
ascribed to originalists the qualities and aspirations of their 
critics, and vice versa. 
After all, it has been critics of originalism, not the 
originalists, who have most often betrayed a powerful yearning 
for a higher-than-human or transcendent Constitution,6 
accompanied by a dissatisfaction—”disgust,” if you like—for the 
 
 4. Originalists with whom I am acquainted (and, speaking as a sort of “fellow 
traveler,” I am acquainted with a fair number of them) often view Balkin’s position as 
interesting, or curious, or misguided and unpersuasive, but I have not encountered 
originalists who find either Balkin or his views “disgusting.” I take it, though, that 
Koppelman is indulging in a bit of provocative ironic hyperbole to frame his thesis—a 
thesis, it should be noted, that is plainly admiring toward Balkin’s work. 
 5. Koppelman suggests that the “Early Balkin”—the one associated with 
deconstruction and postmodernism—accomplished this disenchantment discursively. The 
“Later Balkin,” more subtle and oblique, has confirmed the deconstructive 
demonstration performatively—by embracing originalism without relinquishing his 
progressive commitments, and thereby acting out the collapse of originalism into its long-
time nemesis, “living Constitutionalism.” Koppelman’s interpretation of Balkin has the 
virtue—or is it a vice?—of giving a kind of (persistently) subversive and (recently) 
deceptive unity to Balkin’s earlier and current work. 
 6. For a lengthier discussion of this tendency, see Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583 (1993). 
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merely human Constitution. Thus, we behold Ronald Dworkin 
insisting that the Constitution and the law must be viewed as a 
body of comprehensive and coherent moral principles, fully 
accessible only to a demigod like Dworkin’s Hercules.7 Dworkin 
disdains, as unworthy of our respect, a constitution understood 
merely as the legal expression of a series of political decisions 
and compromises.8 Or we observe Larry Sager, who regards the 
Constitution as a perfect embodiment of justice.9 Or Robin 
West, who views the Constitution not so much as a mundane 
legal instrument as “a source of moral insight and a vision of the 
just society”10 
To be sure, not all of those who reject originalism are given 
to these exhilarating visions (or hallucinations?). Some favor a 
humbler “common law Constitution” in which meanings evolve 
historically along with changing values and commitments of the 
political community.11 But as one might expect, this more 
Burkean conception of the Constitution fits awkwardly with a 
practice of an active and “progressive” judicial review. At some 
point, it seems, the argument has to be (unless it deliberately 
veers in an elitist direction) that nine elderly men and women 
insulated inside a marble building in Washington are more in 
tune with the current, living beliefs and commitments of “the 
People” than elected legislators are—or perhaps than “the 
People” themselves are? That wanton implausibility tends to 
push progressive constitutionalists down the path of viewing the 
Constitution as something more transcendent. The Constitution 
becomes a sort of living deposit of more ethereal principles12—
principles whose content surpasseth the understanding the mere 
mortals who actually draft and vote for the words, and which 
accordingly must in the fullness of time be articulated and 
 
 7. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176–266, 355–99 (1986). 
 8. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 74 (1996) (referring contemptuously 
to those who, by viewing the Bill of Rights as a set of particular historical decisions, 
would turn it into “a document with the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a 
standard form of commercial lease”). 
 9. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 410 (1993). 
 10. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 18, 261 (1994). 
 11. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). I have sometimes inclined to some such more gradualist and 
tradition-oriented conception. Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 
215 (2002). 
 12. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 
453, 525 (1989) (describing Constitution as “a rich lode of principle”). 
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refined (and, of course, forcibly imposed) by judges (counseled, 
of course, by legal scholars).13 
In short, it is non-originalists who characteristically exhibit 
contempt for the merely human Constitution. Conversely, 
originalists make up the party that not only acknowledges but 
indeed insists on the human character of the Constitution. 
Originalists are diversely minded, to be sure; but insofar as 
originalism has a central and animating normative purpose,14 that 
purpose, it seems, is to empower people—actual human beings—
to debate and deliberate and then adopt constitutional 
provisions with the confidence that these will mean and do 
pretty much what the human beings who adopt them understand 
and intend the provisions to mean and do.15 Some originalists 
look to the “subjective” intentions of enactors as the source of 
these meanings16; others view the official enactors as working to 
craft a more “objective” law in accordance with conventional 
linguistic meanings that the enactors are presumed to 
understand and use.17 Either way, originalism treats the 
Constitution and its meanings as a thoroughly human affair. 
This is not to say that originalists cannot believe in 
transcendent realities and truths. Some do, probably, and some 
don’t. Some originalists surely believe that constitutional 
 
 13. In Ronald Dworkin’s “Law’s Empire,” judges famously serve as “princes,” 
while legal philosophers (like Dworkin) assume the role of “seers and prophets.” 
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 407. 
 14. Some originalists disavow any normative purpose, and offer originalism as 
simply a theory of meaning or interpretation. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling 
Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 
191, 195 (2001). My own view, succinctly put, is that there cannot be any “the account” of 
meaning (or of interpretation): there are various possible accounts, and whether a 
particular account is persuasive and useful will depend on what sort of interpretive 
enterprise we are engaged in, and why. By this view, originalism (or any other theory of 
legal interpretation) cannot be divorced from its normative purposes and implications. 
 15. In this vein, Michael McConnell explains: 
All power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the 
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it. It follows that 
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with their understanding. 
This is the theoretical foundation of originalism. If the Constitution is 
authoritative because the people of 1787 had an original right to establish a 
government for themselves and their posterity, the words they wrote should be 
interpreted--to the best of our ability--as they meant them. 
 Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1132 (1998) (citations omitted). For a good account, see KEITH 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 110–59 (1999). 
 16. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?”: Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967 (2004). 
 17. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). 
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provisions are sometimes adopted on the basis of, or as a way of 
implementing, notions of morality or justice that are not merely 
human constructions: I am not sure whether originalism could be 
an even remotely attractive approach—to our own Constitution 
anyway—without some such assumption. Even so, originalism 
insists (with some arguable lapses that I will note momentarily) 
that what counts as law—as valid, enforceable law—is what 
human beings enact, and that the meaning of that law is what 
those human beings understood it to be.18 
So then why does Koppelman suppose that originalists 
yearn for a transcendent Constitution, and that they would be 
disgusted by someone who shows that the Constitution is of 
merely human provenance (if that is what Balkin has shown)? 
There is in fact some slight warrant for this assessment, I believe, 
which I will mention in a moment, but it is not the warrant that 
Koppelman has in mind. The feature of originalism that he 
seems primarily concerned with is an ostensible claim of—or 
perhaps a psychological need for?—determinacy. Originalists 
are said to believe that their approach to interpretation “purges 
adjudication of discretion” (179) and that it delivers “fixity and 
determinacy.” (179) In ascribing this naive belief to originalists, 
however, Koppelman fashions a straw person vulnerable to easy 
pummeling. 
It is true (though in my view unfortunate) that some 
originalists describe original meaning as “objective.” But 
“objective” does not equal “determinate”: there are lots of 
things that are in some sense “objective” but that we do not 
know with certainty, and that accordingly remain undetermined 
(for us). Originalists also argue, sometimes, that unless 
constitutional meaning is tied to “original meaning” or “framers’ 
intentions” or something of the sort, then constitutional texts 
could be interpreted to mean just about anything19: the argument 
implies that originalism is more determinate than non-originalist 
 
 18. In theory, to be sure, originalism is compatible with the possibility that the 
people might simply incorporate some general principle or ideal into positive law and 
authorize future judges to enforce the principle or ideal in whatever way they come to 
understand it. Progressive interpreters like Dworkin (and Balkin) seem inclined to 
suppose that many provisions in the Constitution—especially the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments—do just that. But in fact it seems unlikely that citizens and political actors 
would readily choose to make such an open-ended (and irresponsible?) decision. Thus, 
originalists are characteristically as resistant to such interpretations as non-originalists 
(and a few progressive originalists, like Balkin) are enthusiastic. 
 19. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead Hands: The Interpretation 
of Constitutions and Constitutional Rights, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 227, 234 (2009). 
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interpretation is.  But originalism might be more constrained 
than at least some of its hermeneutical rivals without promising 
anything like “fixity and determinacy.” Maybe some originalists 
make the strong claim of determinacy that Koppelman ascribes 
to them, but I don’t know who they are; I do know that leading 
originalists have frequently been explicit in disavowing that 
claim.20 
In sum, Koppelman’s diagnosis seems for the most part 
backwards, and maybe a little perverse. It indicts originalists for 
a failing that is most characteristic of their opponents, and that in 
fact originalism is calculated to expose and resist. 
II 
Even so, I think that Koppelman is right (even if not for the 
reasons he gives) to suggest that originalists sometimes follow 
non-originalists in succumbing to what we might call the 
“transcendental temptation”—to the urge to view the 
Constitution as more than human.21 In doing this they depart 
from their core commitments—like Christians who retaliate, or 
rational choice theorists who unreflectively perform selfless acts 
of kindness. Still, the departure is common enough. And 
Koppelman is right to perceive that Balkin’s conversion to 
originalism, whether sincere or (as Koppelman seems to imply) 
strategic, serves to underscore this common failing, and thereby 
to raise a serious challenge to the viability of the originalist 
enterprise. 
More specifically, in recent years, many professing 
originalists have stressed that constitutional interpretation 
should seek to ascertain and follow the “principles” supposedly 
contained in constitutional provisions, not the “expected 
applications” of the provisions’ enactors.22 It is understandable 
 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 235; see also Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523 (2003) (“People certainly should not embrace 
originalism in the false belief that it will provide determinate answers to all questions of 
constitutional interpretation: neither originalism nor any other plausible approach to the 
Constitution can do so.”).  
 21. Actually, originalists may go transcendental in more than one way. In my view, 
originalists who have recently argued for an almost Platonic original meaning that need 
not correspond to the understandings of either the “enactors” or the “public”—the flesh-
and-blood human beings who lived at the time a provision was enacted—have departed 
from originalism’s healthy insistence on viewing law and meaning as human. But this is a 
rarified heresy which need not be discussed here. 
 22. See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Original Meaning of 
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
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that originalists would emphasize interpretation in accordance 
with constitutional “principles.” For one thing, a constitution 
understood as an embodiment of principles may seem more 
worthy of respect. In addition, originalists are sometimes drawn 
to the “principled” approach as a way of justifying decisions—
mainly Brown v. Board of Education—that seem beyond 
criticism but that are difficult to explain on originalist 
assumptions: Robert Bork’s defense of Brown is a notable 
instance.23 Originalists also turn to principle to deflect the 
familiar “dead hand of the past” objection. If originalism entails 
following the particular notions and conceptions of men who 
have been dead for centuries, that is, the approach may indeed 
seem intolerably reactionary. But if originalism means following 
the “principles” adopted in the past—principles that presumably 
may be or must be adapted to present circumstances—the 
approach seems less musty. Or at least so goes the argument.24 
Beyond such tactical considerations, it seems that originalist 
interpreters must of necessity view constitutional provisions as 
expressing principles, or at least general categories of some sort, 
if the provisions are to have any current and useable meaning at 
all. Imagine an interpretive approach that tried to eschew 
“principles” and categories in favor of some sort of radical 
nominalism in which words are understood to refer not to 
universals or real categories, but only to the particular items or 
instances contemplated by the person uttering the words. Thus, 
when I say “red” I am not referring to any general quality or 
property; rather, I am simply using the term as a shorthand to 
describe a number of particular instances that I find it 
convenient to group together—my niece’s hair, the apple I am 
munching on at the moment, the sunset I saw yesterday evening, 
and so forth (possibly including the color my face will turn when 
I try to defend this ill-conceived nominalistic notion against any 
moderately intelligent interlocutor). On this assumption, 
constitutional interpretation would be impossible. The term 
 
AMERICA 162–63 (1990). I have elsewhere argued that the distinction between 
“principles” and “expected applications,” if not illusory, is at least overdrawn and often 
misleading. Steven D. Smith, That Old Time Originalism 11 (Univ. San Diego Sch. Law, 
Research Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1150447.  
 23. Bork, supra note 22, at 82. 
 24. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren 
Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 249–50 (1991) (arguing that “originalism 
presents no question of rule by the ‘dead hand of the past’” because “[o]riginalists 
properly seek in the historical materials an intelligible principle capable of guiding 
contemporary decision”). 
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“cruel” in the Eighth Amendment would refer to a particular set 
of punishments that the framers happened to disfavor. 
(Beheading? The rack? But don’t even these terms refer to 
categories of punishments?) The term “persons” in the Equal 
Protection Clause would encompass those human beings known 
to the enactors of the clause; once those persons passed beyond 
this mortal vale, the term would have no further application, and 
hence would effectively expire. 
This sort of radical nominalism would make originalist 
constitutionalism (and probably law itself, and maybe 
communication generally) impossible. So it seems that 
originalists have no choice but to treat constitutional provisions 
as expressions of general categories of some sort.25 Often, it 
seems, those categories are conceived of in terms of “principles.” 
But this apparently inevitable resort to something like 
principles also presents serious problems. Only one of those 
problems need be mentioned here26: understanding 
constitutional provisions as embodiments of principles opens up 
originalism to precisely the sort of open-ended, licentious 
interpretations (licentious at least from the perspective of more 
staid originalists) that Balkin offers. After all, many and perhaps 
most originalists have long advocated, basically, the “method of 
text and principle”: Balkin, arguably, is simply a more prodigal 
practitioner of that method. He is, one might say, Bork-
explaining-Brown ratcheted up a level or two. No doubt Balkin 
has taken originalist methods in directions that many originalists 
do not want to go. But in what sense are his general methods, as 
opposed to his particular conclusions, so different from what 
many other originalists commend? 
More constrained originalists might of course quarrel with 
Balkin’s specific arguments and conclusions. They might argue 
that he has extracted the wrong principle from some 
constitutional text, or that he has misunderstood or misapplied 
that principle in reaching some particular conclusion. Once the 
disagreements shape up in this way, though, it seems that Balkin 
has won. The difference between originalism and “living 
Constitutionalism” has vanished, and all parties are playing the 
 
 25. Cf. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 703, 711 (2009) (“By necessity, legislators, and 
certainly constitution-makers, deal in categories.”).  
 26. For discussion of other problems, see Smith, supra note 22 at 20–22. 
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sort of game that Balkin and Dworkin and company want to 
play. 
For academics, there may be nothing to lament in this 
development. Originalism achieves a kind of academic 
respectability, and originalists and non-originalists can join 
together to debate a host of interesting questions, both historical 
and theoretical. What is the best account of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause? What is the most 
philosophically adequate way to conceive of the “meanings” that 
interpreters seek to discover or construct? Alas, what gets lost or 
forgotten is merely . . . the practical normative purpose that 
animated originalism in the first place—namely, the purpose of 
permitting the People (meaning the actual human beings who 
write constitutional provisions and read them and argue about 
them and ultimately vote for or against them) to make and 
entrench political decisions with the assurance that those 
entrenched decisions will mean and do essentially what the 
People understand and intend them to mean and do. Thus, 
originalists who resort too readily to “principle” have as a 
practical matter abandoned the project that was their reason for 
being in the first place. They thereby validate Lon Fuller’s 
observation that “[n]o one more than [the legal philosopher] 
runs the risk of forgetting what he is trying to do. In no field 
more than his is the thinker likely to be lured from his goal into 
bypaths of his own thought or fall a victim to his own metaphors 
and abstractions.”27 
So then, is Koppelman right after all, despite his topsy-turvy 
ascription of roles and attitudes? Are originalists in the end, and 
despite their contrary pretensions, beguiled by the temptation of 
a transcendent Constitution? And has Balkin succeeded in 
showing that originalism is not viable as an approach that is truly 
distinct from the methods used by proponents of the “living 
Constitution”? 
Not necessarily. But the prospects for a viable and 
distinctive originalism depend, I think, on resistance to the easy 
move to “principle,” and on retention of something more like a 
notion of commonsensical and conventional categories. 
In this vein, a faithfully originalist approach to free exercise 
or equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment would not 
primarily try to extract some principle from the relevant 
 
 27. LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 2 (1940). 
!!!SMITH-271-ORIGINALISMANDTHEMERELYHUMANCONSTITUTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010  10:48 AM 
198 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:189 
 
constitutional provision and then use that principle as the point 
of departure for elaborating a constitutional doctrine and 
jurisprudence largely insulated (by the principle) from what the 
human beings who enacted the provision thought it meant. The 
approach would not treat “expected applications” and 
“meaning” as identical, exactly; it would recognize that 
constitutional provisions necessarily refer to categories, not just 
to lists of particular instances that the enactors had in mind. But 
a genuinely originalist approach would insist that the pertinent 
question is not “What does the category cover, really?” or “What 
does the principle actually entail?” The question, rather, is 
“What did the category (or the principle) mean to them?”—
namely, to the people or the generation who adopted the 
provision. 
III 
So, is this sort of admirably unambitious, resolutely 
unprincipled originalism actually possible? It seems to be 
available as a matter of commonsense practice. Justice Scalia 
employs it, I think, when even in the face of disdainful criticism 
from both non-originalists and professing originalists, he 
maintains that the Eighth Amendment cannot be interpreted to 
prohibit capital punishment because the enactors plainly 
authorized such punishment. Similarly, even without (or 
especially without) any overall theory of what the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally intended or understood to do, the 
academically unadulterated will know to be wary when a scholar 
asserts that the amendment, interpreted according to its original 
meaning, “protect[s] homosexuals from discrimination even if 
nobody knew there were such things as homosexuals in 1868, or, 
if they knew what homosexuals were, would have opposed the 
extension of the principle to that social group.”28  They will 
perceive this assertion as, most likely, the product of a piece of 
(perhaps artful, perhaps sincere, perhaps well-intended) 
academic sophistry. 
But can this unsophistical and unsophisticated approach 
survive without—or, more to the point, can it survive in the face 
of—theoretical examination and elaboration? I’m honestly not 
sure. In recent years, originalism has become a highly theoretical 
enterprise.29 I have elsewhere expressed doubts—doubts, not 
 
 28. Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 488. 
 29. The outstanding manifestation is surely Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic 
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confident judgments—about the value of some of this 
theorizing.30  But I also suspect that originalism would benefit if 
more of the theoretical acumen were directed not so much 
toward elaborating and widening the gulf between 
“intentionalist” and “public” (or between “subjective” and 
“objective”) accounts of meaning but instead toward explaining 
the workings of what we might call conventional categories. How 
is it that enactors of a legal provision can adopt or incorporate 
categories that are not simply lists of particular instances without 
those categories assuming some sort of Platonic status (or, worse 
yet, merely verbal status), thereby becoming unmoored from the 
conscious, concrete intentions and understandings of the people 
who chose to approve them?31 How, in short, can we keep the 
Constitution a merely human document? 
I have suggested that the animating purpose of originalism 
is to permit “the People” to adopt constitutional provisions with 
the confidence that these provisions will mean basically what the 
People understand them to mean, and will have basically the 
implications and consequences that the People intend the 
provisions to have. In a political community with democratic 
commitments or pretensions, that seems a worthy purpose. But 
the enterprise does seem to depend on something like the 
possibility of conventional or merely human (as opposed to 
either “real,” in the philosophical sense, or merely verbal) 
categories. If, in attempting to explain why Balkin is not a 
faithful originalist, theorists are prompted to focus on and 
develop that possibility, then Balkin (assisted by Koppelman) 
will have done originalism—and, more generally, the on-going 
project of democratic self-governance—a valuable service. 
 
 
Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 30. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22. 
 31. For at least the beginnings of an effort in this direction, see Larry Alexander & 
Emily Sherwin, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 160–62 (2008). 
